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Abstract 
A significant part of scholarship on media in Africa has adopted the normative ideal of liberal 
democracy which defines democracy primarily as electoral democracy. Media institutions, in 
this regard, are considered to play an important role in strengthening the democratic process 
and making government more accountable to its citizens. Media are seen as constituting a 
discursive space or Habermasian public sphere where issues of public concern can be 
deliberated. Audiences are treated as citizens engaged in public dialogue in and through the 
media. In this approach, a major task of modern mass media is to offer information in order to 
enable citizens to participate meaningfully in political life such as providing fair and ‘objective’ 
coverage on all major candidates in elections which would allow citizens to make a well-
informed choice. This article critiques the tendency in work on media in Africa to equate 
democracy with a form of electoral democracy. First of all, the article advocates for a more 
substantive definition of democracy which goes beyond merely the regular conduct of free and 
fair elections, a multi-party system, respect for human rights and press freedom. Adopting 
radical democracy as normative ideal reveals the crucial role of media - beyond merely elections 
- in democratising power relations and correcting structural inequalities. Secondly, the article 
argues that liberal-democratic approaches to media and elections presuppose a universal 
meaning of elections, hereby ignoring the particular embedded meaning that elections obtain in 
the African context. Instead of treating media as the neutral arbiters of information on election 
candidates, I offer an alternative, critical research agenda which considers the engagement 
between media institutions and political actors as a symbiotic relationship that ultimately seeks 
to legitimise certain election candidates and condone elections rituals as democratic events par 
excellence. 
 
Keywords: media in Africa, elections, media-state relations, liberal democracy, radical 
democracy 
 
Most studies carried out on media and elections in Africa have addressed the issue from within a 
liberal-democratic model of media-state relations.
1
 This is concomitant with dominant themes in 
scholarship on both media in Africa and the broader field of media and elections. Knowledge 
production is always situated within a particular social, political or economic context. Hence, this 
article treats scholarship on media and elections in Africa as a discursive formation in itself, i.e. 
– echoing Foucault - as a “historically contingent form of knowledge, intimately connected to 
                                                 
1
 See for example Kadhi and Rutten (2001) and Abdi Ismail and Deane (2008) on Kenya; Temin and Smith (2002) 
on Ghana; Waldahl (2004, 2005a, 2005b) and Chuma (2008) on Zimbabwe; Andriantsoa and Andriasendrarivony 
(2005) on Madagascar; Teshome (2009) on Ethiophia; and Frère (2011) on Central Africa. 
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prevailing structures and relations of power at the time of its formation” (Abrahamsen 2000: 
143). The dominance of the liberal-democratic model of media-state relations should be seen in 
the context of the flourishing of the ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy’ agenda in the wake of 
the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An important reason for the success of 
this agenda was “the collapse of Communism as an alternative, non-capitalist development 
model” which “made donor states more confident of the superiority of their own economic and 
political solutions” (Abrahamsen 2000: 42-43).  
Furthermore, subsequent to the failure of economic structural adjustment packages 
recommended by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 
1980s and 1990s to many African countries, ‘democracy’ emerged as a remedy convenient for 
the international financial institutions (IFIs). By blaming the disastrous economic consequences 
of structural adjustment policies on the ‘poor governance’ of African governments, the IFIs were 
able to absolve themselves from any responsibility for the range of economic crises in Africa 
(Abrahamsen 2000). Proponents of ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy’ saw bad leadership at 
the national level as the major cause of poverty and economic decline. Their analysis thus 
primarily put the blame for poverty and ‘underdevelopment’ on African nation-states instead of 
on the broader global system of power relations in which African countries remained profoundly 
marginalised. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Africa was therefore increasingly framed as 
‘undemocratic continent’ in Western government policy, donor and academic accounts. While a 
strong, almost authoritarian state was previously seen as a conduit for development, from the late 
1990s onwards, this model was more and more considered as a barrier to economic development.  
In the ‘good governance’ discourse, ‘democracy’ emerged “as an unproblematic concept, 
an unquestionable good about which there is little or no difference of opinion” (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2001: 259). Instead of treating democracy as a taken-for-granted notion, I consider it as 
a good example of what Gallie has referred to as an ‘essentially contested concept’, i.e. a concept 
“the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part 
of their users” (1955/56: 169). In the African context, the concept of ‘democracy’ has often been 
deployed to refer to the normative ideal of ‘liberal democracy’ which includes the frequent 
conduct of free and fair elections; the existence of multiple political parties; and respect for basic 
human rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association. 
Within this understanding of democracy, media play a central role in strengthening the 
democratic process and making government more accountable to its citizens. In the liberal-
democratic or libertarian model, mass media - and particularly the press - must act as watchdogs 
guarding against possible abuses of power by governments. They must fulfil their role as ‘fourth 
estate’. Press freedom is seen as a vital guarantee to enable the media to play this role. The state 
is expected to create an open environment in which different media can flourish and compete. 
Media constitute an important arena for public debate, or ‘public sphere’ in the words of 
Habermas (1989).  
In the 1990s, academic work on media in Africa increasingly began to shift from a focus 
on the development journalism model as normative ideal towards a dominance of the liberal-
democratic perspective as desirable model of media-state relations in Africa.  
These developments cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration the changing 
position of universities on the continent in the 1990s and the growing importance of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and private research institutions in research on media and 
communication in Africa. The imposition of structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s by 
institutions such as the WB and the IMF led to drastic cuts in budgets available for higher 
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education and other public services. This resulted in a growth of private universities and an 
expansion of privatised education and research programmes in public universities (Zeleza and 
Olukoshi 2004). Universities in Africa have become increasingly reliant on donor funds, as have 
poorly paid lecturers who due to low wages have been forced to take on research consultancies 
which, as Zeleza has pointed out, has led to “the transformation of African intellectuals into 
‘paid native informants’ for foreign donors” (2003: 157).  
While African universities became more and more dependent on donor funding, ‘good 
governance’ and ‘democracy’ emerged as major priorities and policy conditions for funding from 
Western donors in the 1990s. In this context, donor-funded research institutions and think-tanks 
have come to play an increasingly important role in research on media and communication in 
Africa and have also been a major source of publications and even journals.
2
 Examples of non-
governmental and donor-funded research institutions are the Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa (OSISA), the Namibia-based Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) (which also has 
country offices in the broader SADC region), the South Africa-based Freedom of Expression 
Institute (FXI) and GenderLinks, and the Ghana-based Media Foundation of West Africa 
(MFWA). Donor funding priorities have contributed to shape the research agendas of these 
institutions which have mostly advocated the principles of the liberal-democratic model of 
media-state relations. They have for example highlighted the importance of press freedom, 
liberalisation of the airwaves, and ‘fair’ and ‘objective’ media coverage in the run-up to 
elections.  
The liberal-democratic model has not only shaped scholarship on media in Africa but has 
also dominated broader scholarly debate on politics in Africa. As Chabal (2009: 3) recently 
argued: 
 
Democratic theory, which is virtually hegemonic today, harks back to a straightforward 
developmental approach that is reminiscent of earlier modernization models. Sustained by a 
vision of liberal democracy as the only viable model of modern politics, this theory interprets the 
present blossoming of multiparty elections in Africa as the early phase of an ineluctable move 
towards democratization. Rooted in institutionalist notions of political change, it rests on the 
supposition that the practices of democratic elections will eventually result in the emergence of a 
democratic political ‘culture’. Like earlier democratic theories, it is universalist, teleological and 
steeped in a notion of modernization as a variant of Westernisation.  
 
In this article, I critique this particular entry point into the debate on media and elections in 
Africa. Instead, drawing upon the concept of ‘radical democracy’, it proposes an alternative 
research agenda which treats elections as ritual events embedded in very specific local contexts. I 
interrogate this proposal further by drawing on the relation between media institutions and 
political actors during Zimbabwe’s elections in the 2000s. Before discussing this particular case, 
I review four dominant themes in scholarship on media and elections which, I argue, all relate to 
liberal-democratic interpretations of the relation between media and elections: public opinion 
and voters’ preferences; agenda-setting and the election campaign; impact of media forms on 
election styles; and media coverage of elections. 
 
Public opinion and voters’ preferences 
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 For example, in April 2006 the South Africa-based NGOs Gender Links and the Gender and Media Southern 
Africa Network (GEMSA) launched the Southern Africa Media Diversity Journal, available from: 
http://www.genderlinks.org.za/item.php?i_id=168 (last accessed: 12 August 2008). 
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Although some studies exist on the role of media in elections in Africa (see footnote 1), 
scholarship on media and elections is characterised by a bias towards elections in the United 
States. In broad terms, research on media and elections is strongly associated with the rise of the 
discipline of communication science in the United States. Early studies in the history of the 
discipline focused on the role of mass media in shaping public opinion and voters’ preferences, 
for example in the 1940 and 1948 elections in the United States (Lazarsfeld et al 1944; Berelson 
1954 et al). Primarily drawing upon quantitative research, this work sought to establish a 
correlation between media coverage and voting behaviour and other influences such as family 
and opinion leaders (see also more recent work by Patterson 1980; Cavanaugh 1995).  
From a more qualitative, critical media studies research tradition, this work is problematic 
as it uncritically accepts the possibility of researching causal relations between texts and 
audiences. Many scholars have of course subsequently challenged the media effects tradition, 
with a particularly robust critique provided by Gauntlett (1998). But the body of work on media 
and elections can also be further questioned for its underlying motive which is undoubtedly 
gaining more control over voting publics by developing a better understanding of their voting 
behaviour. As John Hartley (2005: 82) has argued: 
 
[Television audiences] are the invisible fictions that are produced institutionally in order for various 
institutions to take charge of the mechanisms of their own survival. Audiences may be imagined, 
empirically, theoretically or politically, but in all cases the product is a fiction that serves the needs 
of the imagining institution.  
 
Public opinion research on the influence of media on voting behaviour is likely to serve the 
institutional needs of political parties keen to understand the way in which constituencies vote 
and the role of media in this regard. The term ‘audience’ or ‘voting constituency’ could be seen 
as an ideological construct that ultimately serves those in power. Thus, scholarship is aimed at 
knowing the audience with the ultimate aim of being able to better influence voters. Within the 
African context, the Afrobarometer project has carried out “[a] comparative series of national 
public attitude surveys on democracy, markets, and civil society”.3 The strong donor support for 
this project from a range of European Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the World Bank alludes to the stakes involved in 
knowing the audience - African voting publics - for purposes of foreign policy in this instance.  
 
Setting the agenda: media institutions versus political parties 
A second strand of work on media and elections has compared the relative power of media and 
political parties in the mediation of election campaigns. In an influential article, McCombs and 
Shaw (1972: 176) argued that media play an important role in determining what information 
audiences ultimately get about election campaigns: 
 
In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in 
shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to 
attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position. In reflecting what 
candidates are saying during a campaign, the mass media may well determine the important issues – 
that is, the media may set the “agenda of the campaign”.  
 
Researchers have highlighted the symbiotic relationship between media and political parties, and 
                                                 
3
 See http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.html (last accessed: 4 October 2010). 
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have investigated the extent to which political parties are able to influence media coverage of 
elections, or the extent to which coverage is shaped by the particular ideological stance of media 
institutions. The underlying motivation of this strand of research is the concern about the way in 
which media influence voting behaviour. However, instead of attributing media with a role in 
actively changing people’s opinions on politics and election candidates, agenda-setting scholars 
have emphasised the role of media in determining what issues the electorate should be concerned 
about instead of what to think about these issues. As Cohen (1963: 13) wrote in a much-quoted 
line: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”. Countless studies have emerged 
from within the subfield of political communication on the role of media in US election 
campaigns.
4
  
 
The medium is the message: changing election styles 
A third strand of scholarship has examined the way in which different forms of media have 
impacted on the way in which elections are held. The increasing role of television in elections 
has been primarily associated with Ronald Reagan’s presidency who not only effectively used 
the medium for campaigning and governing purposes but who also of course began his career as 
a film and television actor (Denton 1988). According to Denton (1988: xii), television changed 
the face of American politics in important ways: 
 
There are three critical dimensions to the primetime presidency. First, the message must fit the 
medium in both form and content. Second, industry demands for news must be carefully crafted by 
the incumbent. Finally, today’s president must be, if not an actor, at least a “media celebrity”.  
 
While Reagan has been branded as the first ‘primetime president’, the 2008 elections in the US, 
on the other hand, have been popularly portrayed in the media as the first ‘Facebook elections’ 
(Fraser and Dutta 2008). Scholars have attributed important roles to social media such as 
YouTube and Facebook in the election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 (Harfoush 2009; 
Metzgar and Maruggi 2009; Hendricks and Denton 2010). 
 The changing form of politics as a result of different forms of media has generally been 
viewed with suspicion by conventional political communication scholars who have raised 
concern about the mediatisation of politics which is seen as leading to a dilution of serious 
politics and a ‘dumbing down’ of news coverage with politics being increasingly about form and 
style rather than substance. For example, Denton (1988: xiii) commented as follows on the role 
of television in US politics: 
 
Television was going to make us more politically informed and democratic. The fact is that 
television has not made us more informed in our election choices or more democratic in terms of 
electoral participation. And, as the Reagan presidency has demonstrated, television cannot serve 
as a check on presidential power. 
 
More recently, the role of social media in US presidential elections has been evaluated in a more 
positive light as making possible an increased participation of ordinary people in political 
communication. For example, for Metzgar and Maruggi (2009: 161-162), “[t]he 2008 U.S. 
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 Arterton 1984; Crewe and Harrop 1986; Owen 1991; Stempel and Windhauser 1991; Kendall 1995; Just 1996; 
O’Rourke 1997; Kendall 2000; Kellner 2001; Benoit 2003; Adams 2005; Panagopoulos 2007; Pfau et al 2007; 
Skewes 2007. 
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presidential election was another step in the direction of democratic discourse enabled by social 
media technology. While the end-state of such discourse is not possible to predict, what is clear 
is that the people formerly known as the audience, empowered by technologies and spurred on 
by their fellow formerly passive audience compatriots have a bigger role to play than ever 
before”. 
 
Media coverage of election campaigns and candidates 
A fourth theme in literature on media and elections is the way different media have covered 
election campaigns and candidates. The underlying assumption of this work is that mass media 
are crucial in shaping voting decisions. The normative premise here is that media – and public 
broadcasters and other publicly-funded media in particular – have a duty to cover elections in a 
fair manner, partly because they receive tax funds. Media should give equal weight to election 
candidates and enable voters to make a fully informed decision. They are expected to provide 
adequate information on the voter registration process and inform voters about the various issues 
put forward by different political parties.  
 Measuring coverage against these ideals, political communication scholars have raised 
concern about the “media’s insistence on covering election process issues such as competitor 
league tables and who is doing the best character assassination on whom, in preference to 
elaborating policy differences” (Ross and Nightingale 2003: 106-107, emphasis by original 
authors). Partly as a result of the obsession with poll results, election coverage is seen to often 
equal the coverage of a sporting contest, with ample use of game metaphors and 
enemy/adversary language (Hollander 2006: 570). Other scholars have linked these argument to 
the growing ‘tabloidisation’ of news media and the increasing emergence of ‘infotainment’ that 
does not provide citizens with good quality information to make adequately informed decisions 
(Franklin 1994; Sparks and Tulloch 2000; Thussu 2007). These changes are linked to broader 
developments in the global media landscape with the increasing privatisation of public 
broadcasters and the commercialisation of news media environments. 
In the specific African context, the importance of media coverage in elections has been 
highlighted by scholars who have looked at the various ways in which elections have been 
reported (Waldahl 2004; Waldahl 2005a; Waldahl 2005b; Chuma 2008). But increasingly, a 
range of projects and non-governmental organisations have also been established in recent years 
that have focused on monitoring the reporting of various types of media in the run-up to 
elections. Donor-funded groups such as the South Africa-based Media Monitoring Africa 
(MMA) and the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) have used different tools to 
measure ‘bias’ in news coverage of elections.5 Various workshops on how to report elections 
have been offered to journalists of African media houses and reporting guides with best practice 
examples have been designed (Cammack and Carver 1998; Lange 1999; Khaguli and Esipisu 
2009).  
 
Elections as ritual events 
Previous literature on media and elections has thus focused on four strands: the link between 
media public opinion/voters’ preferences, the tension between media and political parties in 
setting the agenda of media coverage, the impact of media forms on election styles and media 
coverage of election candidates. These four approaches have made a number of assumptions. 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.mediamonitoringafrica.org for more on MMA and http://www.mmpz.org/ for more on 
MMPZ (last accessed: 6 October 2010). 
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First of all, they have adopted a rational choice model in which media offer citizens 
‘information’ to enable them to make a well-informed decision in elections, hereby downplaying 
the ideological role of media in constructing a particular version of reality. Secondly, they have 
assumed that elections offer real and valuable opportunities for citizens to participate in politics. 
Mass media might have dumbed down their meaning or turned elections into ‘horse races’, 
‘games’, ‘spectacles’ or ‘melodramas’ but elections still offer key opportunities for citizens to 
exert their democratic right and continue to function as the primary means through which 
citizens participate in politics. Elections thus play a fundamental role in the doctrine of liberal 
democracy. They are seen as the primary mechanism through which citizens leave their mark on 
national politics and are treasured for enabling citizens to participate in the election of their 
leaders. 
However, as this article contends, the central role of elections in understandings of 
African democracy must be questioned, even more so in a context which continues to be marred 
by sharp power differences and economic inequalities. For example, in the case of South Africa, 
the extension of the right to vote to South Africans of all colours and the country’s first general 
elections in 1994 is commonly described as the ‘advent of democracy and freedom’. But what is 
the meaning of electoral democracy and the right the vote when thousands of South Africans 
have not seen any substantial improvement in their living standards? Commenting on the 
transition from Apartheid to ‘democracy’, Steyn (2008) evaluates the outcome as follows: 
 
The outcome has been a liberal democratic constitution with an economic policy vision laced with 
a programme of economic liberalisation, which disproportionately entrenches the mutual class 
interests of both the white and emerging black elite. The outcome of this scenario is that it has led 
to a form of democracy that has little relevance for the majority of South Africa’s citizens. The 
democratic game tends to be reduced by the power of entrenched elites and what is acceptable to 
these elites frequently provides the boundaries of democratic politics.
6
 
 
The dominance of elementary, procedural and electoral definitions of democracy in the African 
context is highly problematic, given the sharp inequities in many African nation-states. As the 
Nigerian political scientist, Claude Ake (1992: 40, quoted in Lumumba-Kasongo 2005: 4) has 
argued: 
 
Democracy requires even development, otherwise it cannot give equal opportunities to 
all, it cannot incorporate all to articulate their interests to negotiate them. It cannot 
produce a political community in which all are able to enjoy rights, nor avoid 
compromising justice because it takes the development of consciousness and capabilities 
to seek and enjoy justice. That is why development, especially even development in this 
broad sense, is an integral part of the process of democratisation.  
 
Hence, it is essential to move beyond liberal definitions of democracy which have their 
limitations in radically changing economic power relations, crucially important to the majority 
of Africans who find themselves in marginal, economic circumstances. Albeit writing from a 
different (European) context, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: xv) have argued that: 
 
                                                 
6
 Steyn, Ibrahim, The shorthand of electoral democracy: democracy for some, South African Civil Society 
Information Service (SACSIS), 15 May 2008,  
http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/news/detail.asp?idata=108&iChannel=1&nChannel=news&iCat=250 (last 
accessed: 6 October 2010).  
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[T]he problem with ‘actually existing’ liberal democracies is not with their constitutive values 
crystallized in the principles of liberty and equality for all, but with the system of power which 
redefines and limits the operation of those values. This is why our project of ‘radical and plural 
democracy’ was conceived as a new stage in the deepening of the ‘democratic revolution’, as the 
extension of the democratic struggles for equality and liberty to a wider range of social relations.  
 
These scholars thus advocate for a more substantive, radical definition of democracy which goes 
beyond merely the regular conduct of free and fair elections, a multi-party system and respect for 
human rights. This definition is particularly relevant in the African context where liberal 
democracy often coincides with stark, economic inequalities.  
In a more radical interpretation of democracy, elections could then be seen as mere rituals 
to endorse the power of the ruling classes. As Bennett (1983: 49) has argued, previous literature 
 
[i]s based on the assumption that elections are actually arenas in which issues can be specified and 
resolved. In light of the absence of any policy-making process, it might make more sense to 
regard presidential elections as rituals that function to promote the myth that elections are arenas 
for specifying and resolving issues. If elections serve to promote myths, then their melodramatic 
aspects are not inexplicable failings, but defining characteristics of a ritual. 
 
Liberal democracy could then be defined as “a set of rules intended to legitimise bourgeois 
power” (McNair 2003: 24). A more radical research agenda on the relation between media and 
elections would adopt a framework in which elections are treated as mere rituals that 
rubberstamp those in power. Such an agenda could investigate the way in which media – in 
collaboration with politicians – create the myth that elections offer voters a real opportunity to 
participate in politics. As Bennett (1983: 51) has argued:  
 
[R]eform proposals for things like better press coverage, more citizen education, or increasing 
political participation in elections may perpetuate the very problems they address by distracting 
attention from the underlying realities of political processes.  
 
So, adopting radical democracy as analytical and normative framework points us to the 
limitations of electoral, liberal and elementary forms of democracy which are insufficiently able 
to truly democratise power relations on the continent. A ritual approach to elections considers 
these not necessarily as true occasions for citizens to participate in political affairs but instead as 
critical moments in the (re)legitimisation of those in power. 
 
Embedded meanings of elections in Africa 
Apart from assuming that elections offer real opportunities for citizen participation, another 
limitation of liberal-democratic approaches to media and elections is that these tend to 
presuppose that elections are part of “a set of ‘universalistic’ practices that is carried out in a 
similar, orderly manner everywhere in the world, with the entire process being driven by the 
arrival of an outcome by aggregation of individual votes” which ignores that “[t]he modes and 
reasons of electioneering practices are never random but unavoidably embedded in and hewed 
from the local cultural milieu” (Huat 2007: 3). In order to gain a better understanding of media 
and elections in Africa, it is crucial to interrogate the particular meaning of elections in the 
African context. 
 The advent of multi-party elections in Africa has often been praised as coinciding with 
the introduction of more democratic regime but should also be seen against the background of 
the growing hegemony of liberal democracy in the post-Cold War period. 
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One could argue that in the 1970s and 1980s, the one-party state was still considered to be 
acceptable as political model; not only to African governments but also to global forces. The 
justification was that a one-party state could offer unity to artificially created African nation-
states. It would enable countries to offer a common purpose in building a prosperous nation and 
would strengthen national consciousness in the face of ethnic strife and divisions. For example, 
as Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe argued in the 1980s, “[w]e are one family, one 
country, with one nation and one government. So we must have one party. It is that simple” 
(quoted in Shaw 1986: 379-80). Elections – and the multi-party system more broadly – were 
associated with leading to conflict and divisions in newly decolonised countries which were not 
considered to be ‘ready’ for liberal democracy.  
 However, in the post-Cold War context and the growing hegemony of the Washington 
consensus, we see a shift in normative ideas around political systems. Liberal democracy has 
increasingly been celebrated as the most desirable model in the African context (Lumumba-
Kasongo 2005). Free and fair elections emerge as particular conditionalities for African nation-
states to enable them to access donor aid packages. It could then be argued that in certain 
African contexts, elections emerged as much in response to global demands as in reaction to 
popular pressure from citizens. While in Zimbabwe elections emerged as key demands part of 
the liberation struggle, more recently, one could question whether elections are still aimed at 
offering citizens real opportunities to participate in political affairs, or whether these might have 
different meanings instead. As widely reported, Zimbabwe’s conduct of elections in the 2000s 
was marred by violence, intimidation and rigging. In the run-up to the second round of 
Zimbabwe’s 2008 presidential elections, Robert Mugabe made the following statement during a 
rally in Matabeleland North province:  
 
The war veterans came to me and said: ‘President we can never accept that our country which we 
won through the barrel of the gun, be taken merely by an ‘x’ made by a ballpoint pen’. Zvino 
ballpoint pen ichirwisana neAK? Is there going to be a struggle between the two? Ipapo munoona 
kuchirwiwa zvakakomba. Asikana ma'x' achitevera nzira yakatarwa nepfuti? Is that alright? 
Liyekele ukuphikisana lombhobho. Tasunga-naka. Tohwina shudhu.
7
 
 
Full English translation 
The war veterans came to me and said: ‘President we can never accept that our country which we 
won through the barrel of the gun, be taken merely by an ‘x’ made by a ballpoint pen’. Does it 
now mean that the pen can fight against an AK? Is there going to be a struggle between the two? 
That is when you will see a real battle. But if the x follows the route taken by the bullet? Is that 
alright? Do not argue against the gun. We are prepared to defend our heritage. We will win.  
 
This statement echoes another statement that Mugabe made in his role as leading commander of 
the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZNLA) in 1976:  
 
Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the 
product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its 
guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins (quoted in 
Meredith 2007: 1). 
 
Hence, in the case of Zimbabwe, the political leadership has not presented elections as 
opportunities to allow citizens to exert their vote freely, let alone enable them to participate 
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 ‘Land must be yours before I can retire’, The Herald, 20 June 2008. 
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meaningfully in political affairs. This then demands for a rethinking on the meaning of elections 
in the African context. If election results are not presented as opportunities for citizens to 
election their leaders, what might then be the meaning of elections? In the Zimbabwean context, 
it could be argued that in recent years elections have become mere ritual events aimed at meeting 
some of the conditions of elementary, procedural or liberal democracy, introduced on the global 
scene through the hegemony of the Washington consensus. The particular hegemonic meaning of 
democracy as liberal democracy in a way enables states to appear democratic if a handful of 
international democratic procedures are being adhered to. 
  
Elections as ‘media events’ 
If elections are mere rituals to satisfy a global consensus, what might media then mean or do in 
such a context? Instead of treating media as neutral arbiters of information enabling voters to 
make a well-informed rational choice, the focus of our examination could be on the way in 
which they become part of the election ritual by either legitimizing the election process itself or 
certain election candidates. Media coverage of elections should then not be treated as a form of 
‘information’ provided to citizens but instead as reflecting particular local meanings of elections 
as well as reflecting the specific relationship between media institutions and political actors. A 
key event that both demonstrates and requires the symbiotic relationship between media 
institutions and political actors is the campaign rally which forms a key part of the election ritual. 
It is not only a medium in its own right – and it could be argued particularly important in the case 
of rural Africa where mass media penetration is low and voters largely depend on the rally for 
awareness on elections and party manifestos – but it should also be treated as a ‘media event’: an 
event waiting to be mediated by television cameras, an event staged partly for the purpose of 
being covered by formal mass media (Dayan and Katz 1992). In order to offer the electorate a 
semblance of credibility and popularity, political parties have a vested interest in coverage that 
mediates signs of popular support expressed in and through the party rally.  
 For example, in the run-up to Zimbabwe’s 2000 parliamentary elections, Stephen Mpofu, 
the editor of the Bulawayo-based newspaper The Chronicle received a call from the Minister of 
Home Affairs, Dumiso Dabengwa, who was standing as a ZANU-PF candidate in the elections.
8
 
Dabengwa questioned Mpofu on why his rally in Bulawayo was never covered by The 
Chronicle. The newspaper was forced to apologise and to write a story on the rally even though 
none of its reporters actually attended the event. Regardless of this, the following day, the 
paper’s lead story was headlined ‘Dabengwa in electrifying rally’. This example demonstrates 
that politicians attach major significance to media coverage of election campaigns as popular 
attendance at rallies is considered to either reinforce or threaten a party’s popularity. Media 
coverage can play an important role in legitimising the rule of one or the other political party.  
This is further demonstrated by the way in which two ideologically opposed Zimbabwean 
daily newspapers – The Herald which largely supported the agenda of the ruling party ZANU-PF 
and the privately-owned The Daily News which was sympathetic to the opposition MDC - 
covered party rallies in the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections. The coverage of rallies in 
the two papers almost represented ‘inverted discourses’ where The Herald sought to emphasise 
the popularity of ZANU-PF rallies and the unpopularity of MDC rallies. Conversely, The Daily 
News stressed the popularity of MDC rallies and the unpopularity of ZANU-PF rallies. The stark 
degree of intertextuality between the two papers is demonstrated in the following two excerpts of 
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reports in The Herald and The Daily News respectively: 
 
THOUSANDS of Chitungwiza Zanu-PF supporters braved the heat to witness the launch of the 
presidential and mayoral campaign at a rally at the town's Chibuku Stadium.
9
 
 
MORGAN Tsvangirai, the MDC's presidential candidate, yesterday addressed his biggest campaign 
rally ever since launching his bid to dislodge President Mugabe from power. 
About 50 000 supporters attended Tsvangirai's main rally at the Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfield 
suburb where he urged Mugabe not to rig the poll.
10
 
 
While affirming the popularity of their preferred party, the two daily newspapers also sought to 
reinforce the unpopularity of the ‘opposed’ party. For example, both newspapers suggested that 
ZANU-PF (in The Daily News) and MDC (in The Herald) respectively were forced to cancel a 
rally because they allegedly could not drum up sufficient support: 
 
President Mugabe has cancelled his rally at Sakubva Stadium in Mutare today and will instead 
hold rallies outside the city at Checheche in the morning and Zimunya in the afternoon. Morgan 
Tsvangirai, the MDC leader, attracted a large crowd of 15 000 at his first presidential campaign 
address at Sakubva Stadium last Sunday. Top Zanu PF provincial officers said the Mutare rally 
was cancelled because Mugabe was too busy. […] During the campaign for the June 2000 
parliamentary election, about 10 000 people walked out of Sakubva Stadium after Mugabe 
launched a scathing attack on opposition and independent candidates.
11
 
 
POOR attendance forced the MDC to cancel its rally in Marondera yesterday where the opposition 
party leader, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, was supposed to be the main speaker. 
Mr Tsvangirai was greeted by less than 200 people, most of whom had travelled from Harare, at the 
meeting dubbed "MDC Star Rally". MDC leaders last night gave flimsy excuses, saying that their 
supporters failed to attend the rally owing to alleged intimidation by Zanu-PF supporters and war 
veterans.
12
 
 
With regard to the agency of rally attendees, newspapers represented these as either heroes 
willing to support the opposition in the face of rampant voter intimidation (in the case of MDC 
supporters in The Daily News) or pawns bribed by promises of food aid funded by overseas 
forces (in the case of MDC supporters in The Herald). For example, The Herald commented as 
follows on the MDC’s campaign strategies: 
 
The MDC has used food aid as its campaign trump card to woo the rural vote. It has already 
announced that it has secured several thousands tonnes of maize that will last until next year March. 
The MDC has, however, not revealed the source of its food aid only claiming that friends for 
Zimbabwe were waiting in line with some food aid. MDC has been widely criticised for its close ties 
with Western governments who have a hidden agenda to turn the country into a colony again.
13
 
 
The Daily News, on the other hand, could be seen to emphasise the way in which ZANU-PF was 
forcing support through violence and intimidation or food aid: 
 
ZANU PF has been giving out free food and money to mobilise people in Matabeleland to attend 
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rallies addressed by President Mugabe. The paper confirmed this in Umzingwane District where 
people who attended one of the rallies told the newspaper in separate interviews that they attended 
the rallies because they wanted food. […] All the rallies in Matabeleland South were attended by an 
average of 10 000 hungry people who scrambled for food during the gatherings. They received sadza 
and cooked beef. Some villagers at Umzingwane said they were given cooking oil, another scarce 
commodity, and undisclosed sums of money to entice them to attend the rally. […] Other villagers 
from the surrounding areas said they had been told that if they did not attend the rallies they would 
be punished.
14
 
 
In the particular context of a highly polarised media landscape, The Daily News and The Herald 
then were as much involved in the election contest as the two political parties, ZANU-PF and the 
MDC. Through their coverage of party rallies, they sought to legitimise the party they were 
sympathetic to and to delegitimise the ‘enemy’. The quotes above bear testimony to a highly 
intertextual dialogue between the two newspapers in which both papers seemed to respond 
directly to each other’s.  
 Apart from print media, the electronic media arguably play an even more crucial part in 
mediating party rallies because of their ability to visualise the event. In the absence of any 
private broadcasters, it has been well documented that the monopoly, state-controlled Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) strongly privileged the campaign rallies of the ruling party 
ZANU-PF. As the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) has convincingly 
demonstrated, the MDC was rarely offered an opportunity to speak but mostly mediated through 
the voice of ruling party officials. With particular reference to coverage of the campaign rally, 
ZBC’s use of different camera positions served to construct divergent images of party rallies. 
For example, in the case of well-attended MDC rallies, the camera would often only show close-
up pictures of a handful of supporters.15 Some of the supporters shown would be white 
supporters in order to reinforce the image of the MDC as a party controlled by white interests – 
whether Rhodesian or British. ZANU-PF rallies, on the other hand, would be recorded using a 
long-distance angle that would give the impression of a large crowd. Treating elections as 
‘media events’ therefore enables us to highlight the way in which media institutions and political 
actors form particular relationships that are aimed at legitimising elections as credible events and 
condoning certain political actors as legitimate candidates. 
 
Conclusion 
As this article has sought to demonstrate, a critical and radical research agenda on media and 
elections looks beyond elections as real opportunities for citizen participation but instead 
problematises universal meanings of elections and points to the importance of understanding the 
local context in which elections are embedded. While in many Western democracies, political 
leaders present elections as real opportunities for citizens to participate in politics, in some 
African contexts, as the Zimbabwe example demonstrated, politicians do not pretend that 
elections are aimed at enabling the electorate the right to vote their leaders into power. Instead, 
the power of the gun remains important in adjusting the outcome of unfavourable elections. 
Instead of treating media as the neutral arbiters of information on election candidates, I have 
considered the relation between media institutions and political actors as a symbiotic relationship 
that ultimately seeks to legitimise the election ritual as well as certain election candidates. Both 
media institutions and political actors are concerned with attracting a particular readership or 
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support base. Hence, they share a joined agenda of mobilising popular support. An outright 
declaration of support for a particular party could assist in selling newspapers. On the other 
hand, positive coverage of a political party in a newspaper or on television may cultivate further 
support. By highlighting the symbiosis between media institutions and political actors, we come 
to understand how media become incorporated in the election ritual. Finally, it is important to 
emphasise the limitations of the liberal-democratic model of media-state relations which 
continues to frame many studies on media in Africa. Given the low penetration of mass media in 
many parts of Africa and the particular meaning of elections, it is evident that a straightforward 
application of liberal-democratic theory hardly results in a deepened understanding of the role of 
media and elections in Africa. Instead, it might tell us more about what Africa media or politics 
lacks than how it operates. 
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